Similar questions arise with regard to withdrawal under the UUOA. Article 15(C) of the opening ai-type agreement provides that, if all parties to a group decide to withdraw from the UUOA (and the underlying contract), all or some of the parties in the other group may decide that the withdrawing parties may be transferred to them without compensation. The justification for this provision is to allow the non-outgoing group parties to acquire the rights they need to continue to conduct unit operations under the WAUI in the event of the withdrawal of the other group`s parties. The question whether this provision can be implemented must be particularly taken into account in the context of cross-border standardisation. We question whether the two host governments would approve withdrawal provisions within the UUOA that could lead non-party parties to country X to acquire the rights of outgoing contracting parties in country Y without compensation Recognizing the increase in the number of unifications worldwide, the official authority established in 2006 a model unit and agreement form and support guidelines. The 2006 UUOA appointing authority was based on the Joint Operating Agreement form, which was adapted to a standardization scenario and extended to single themes for unitized tanks. There are a large number of comments on the application of international laws, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to reservoirs that cross an international border and the rights and obligations of host Governments under international law.  Rather, this article focuses on specific issues that may arise during negotiations on a UAU and that may require special attention or treatment in a cross-border context of standardization. The 2020 model is an update of the 2006 OFFICIALS Agreement on Unit and Unit Operation.
The second edition proposes an updated model for the association of two blocks under two separate contracts of the same host government. It also offers options and alternatives to the most frequent problems and takes into account in practice the experience gained by numerous standardizations around the world and the lessons learned from the practical use of the original 2006 model. Article 2 of the opening authority-Type of Agreement provides that the UUOA terminates in the event of termination of a contract, unless the remaining parties to the contract (in accordance with the voting procedure at the UUOA) vote to maintain the UUOA in force, in which case, after the withdrawal of a contract, the participation of the remaining group is 100%. This means that the remaining group will have 100% of the rights and obligations of the UUOA (including the right to production). This provision ensures that the parties to the continuous oil contract can acquire the rights they need to continue operating the units under the UUOA. Some believe that the official AI approach is problematic for any standardisation, given that the group that has the remaining contract has no rights with regard to the contractual area covered by the revoked contract. In addition, the ipING approach may be inconsistent with the host country`s oil laws, which legally govern the distribution of rights to the revoked contract in the event of withdrawal, with the rights generally accruing to the host government. The Jubilee Field (Ghana) Unitization and Unit Operating Agreement (Jubilee UUOA), to which the GhanaIan National Oil Company (GNPC) is a party to both treaties, provides that in the event of the expiration, termination or revocation of a contract, the Jubilee UUOA remains in force and that GNPC becomes the contractual group of the expired/terminated/revoked contract and assumes all the rights and obligations of the group in relation to the expired/terminated/revoked contract. . .